DOT REPORT #6 -February, 1996 =========================================================== A condensed version of Department of Transportation rail line decisions and notices published between February 16-29, 1996. =========================================================== CONTENTS: Tonawanda Island Railroad; Emergency Order To Prevent Operation of Trains on Bridge 7708810 Petition for Waiver of Compliance Notice of Application for Approval of Discontinuance or Modification of a Railroad Signal System or Relief From the Requirements of Title 49 CFR Part 236 Consolidated Rail Corporation; Abandonment Exemption; in Lucas County, OH Environmental Impact Statement for Transportation Improvements in the Greenbush Line Corridor in Massachusetts Commuter and Intercity Passenger Railroads, Including Public Authorities Providing Passenger Service, and Affected Freight Railroads; Emergency Order Requiring Enhanced Operating Rules and Plans for Ensuring the Safety of Passengers Occupying the Leading Car of a Train Environmental Impact Statement for the Metrorail Extension to Largo Town Center, Prince Georges County, Maryland Burlington Northern Railroad Company--Abandonment Exemption-- Between Mesa and Basin City, Franklin County, WA ===================================================================== DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Railroad Administration [FRA Emergency Order No. 19, Notice No. 1] Tonawanda Island Railroad; Emergency Order To Prevent Operation of Trains on Bridge 7708810 The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has determined that public safety compels issuance of this Emergency Order requiring the Tonawanda Island Railroad (TIRL) of North Tonawanda, New York, to discontinue operation of trains or any railroad on-track equipment on a railroad bridge numbered 7708810 which spans the Little River between North Tonawanda and Tonawanda Island, New York, until necessary repairs have been made to the bridge. The Tonawanda Island Railroad, a common carrier, is a part of the general system of railroads. Its owner is Mr. Corigan Sanoian, P.E., of Niagara Falls, New York. The TIRL operates over about a 1.5 miles of track, extending from a junction with the Conrail Niagara Branch in North Tonawanda, New York, to Tonawanda Island. The single main track route includes two highway rail grade crossings. One crossing, at River Road in North Tonawanda, is equipped with automated warning devices. The other highway rail grade crossing is located at Main Street in North Tonawanda and is equipped with traffic control signals on each side of the crossing. In addition to the main track, several auxiliary tracks are in service, both at the junction and on Tonawanda Island. To access Tonawanda Island, the TIRL crosses the Little River via a wood and metal bridge identified by a number affixed to its westernmost bent, 7708810. For the purposes of this Emergency Order, the bridge is hereinafter designated as ``Bridge 7708810.'' The bridge consists of two timber trestle approaches, one on each side of a steel through truss swing span. The swing span has been inoperative for many years. The Little River is a navigable waterway formed by a channel of the Niagara River, Ellicott Creek and Tonawanda Creek. It flows into the Niagara River approximately 10 miles above Niagara Falls. The Little River is the site of a significant concentration of pleasure boating during the summer. A marina is located adjacent to and downstream from the bridge. A highway bridge is located about 300 feet downstream. The sole piece of rolling stock regularly used by the TIRL is a 50- ton industrial switcher type locomotive. The railroad's current customer base includes a consignee on Tonawanda Island which receives wood fibre in box cars. There are no consignors. Until approximately one year ago, the TIRL delivered building materials to another consignee on Tonawanda Island. However, that consignee discontinued service from the TIRL after Mr. Sanoian expressed an intent to shut down the railroad. Total traffic for TIRL in 1995 was about 51 cars. FRA's history of inspecting the TIRL under Mr. Sanoian's ownership dates back to 1990. The following chronology highlights FRA activity with respect to the TIRL: October 11, 1990: FRA Chief Inspector John Conklin conducted an operating practices inspection and issued inspection report No. 72, informing Mr. Sanoian that the TIRL was not in compliance with 49 CFR Part 225 (Accident/Incident Reporting), as well as 49 CFR Part 228 (Hours of Service Recordkeeping). December 17, 1990: FRA Railroad Safety Inspector Daniel Feneziani inspected the TIRL locomotive and issued inspection report No. 171, informing Mr. Sanoian of 17 items not in compliance with the Federal railroad safety standards. February 28, 1991: Chief Inspector Conklin conducted an operating practices inspection and issued inspection report No. 30, informing Mr. Sanoian that the TIRL still was not in compliance with 49 CFR Part 225. December 10, 1992: Chief Inspector Conklin conducted an inspection of operating practices and issued inspection report No. 50, informing Mr. Sanoian that the TIRL was not in compliance with 49 CFR Parts 225, 228 and 240 (Qualification and Certification of Locomotive Engineers). October 21, 1993: FRA Chief Inspectors Patrick Sullivan and William Robbins inspected the TIRL locomotive and issued inspection report No. 05, informing Mr. Sanoian of 22 items not in compliance with Federal railroad safety standards. December 7, 1994: Chief Inspector Sullivan conducted an inspection of operating practices and issued inspection report No. 27, informing Mr. Sanoian that the TIRL was not in compliance with 49 CFR Parts 217 (Railroad Operating Rules), 225, 228, and 240. August 9, 1995: FRA Principal Railroad Safety Inspector Bernard T. Lutz inspected the TIRL locomotive and issued inspection report No. 67, notifying Mr. Sanoian of 15 items of non-compliance with Federal railroad safety standards. October 13, 1995: FRA Regional Administrator Mark McKeon mailed Mr. Sanoian a certified letter in which he enumerated the locomotive's conditions of non-compliance with the Federal railroad safety standards. The letter noted that some of the conditions have existed since December 17, 1990. The letter also acknowledged FRA's awareness that the TIRL is a small business with limited resources. Regional Administrator McKeon offered to discuss the defects with Mr. Sanoian in an effort to work with him to bring the railroad into compliance. United States Post Office records indicate that a notice of the certified letter was served on Mr. Sanoian on October 17, October 22, and November 2, before it was returned to the sender as ``unclaimed.'' January 2 and January 4, 1996: FRA Railroad Safety Inspector Ronald Anderson inspected bridge 7708810. His inspection was in response to concerns raised by a New York State Department of Transportation Railroad Safety Inspector. Inspector Anderson concluded that the bridge is unsafe. While inspecting the bridge on January 2, 1996, Inspector Anderson fell through the bridge due to the deteriorated condition of the bridge timbers. January 12, 1996: Inspector Anderson and New York State Department of Transportation Inspector Keith McClain met with Mr. Sanoian to discuss the condition of the bridge. Mr. Sanoian disagreed with Inspector Anderson's assessment of the bridge and stated his belief that the bridge was safe for a load of 500,000 pounds. January 15, 1996: Regional Administrator McKeon and Railroad Safety Inspector Michael Ziolkowski met with Mr. Sanoian to discuss both the locomotive and the bridge. Although he did not agree that the bridge was unsafe, Mr. Sanoian stated that he would not operate over it until it had been repaired and had been inspected by an FRA representative. He further stated that the locomotive would not be used until it was repaired. Regional Administrator McKeon hand-delivered to Mr. Sanoian a copy of the letter of October 13, 1995, which previously had been returned to FRA unclaimed. January 16, 1996: Regional Administrator McKeon prepared and signed a letter confirming the discussions of January 15. The letter, dated January 16, 1995, stated in part: The TIRL bridge is unsafe for the movement of trains, locomotives and other rolling stock. The bridge must not be operated over until it is repaired. The letter noted Mr. Sanoian's verbal assurances that he had obtained the services of a contractor to repair the bridge and that he would provide FRA with an opportunity to inspect the bridge once the repairs were made. He also agreed to repair the locomotive before using it again. The letter further stated that unless the TIRL took immediate steps to repair the bridge, Regional Administrator McKeon would recommend issuance of an Emergency Order prohibiting its use. January 17, 1996: Inspector Ziolkowski hand-delivered the January 16 letter to Mr. Sanoian. Mr. Sanoian stated to Inspector Ziolkowski that the bridge did not have ``a structural problem'' but that it had a ``lateral problem.'' January 18, 1996: During a telephone conference with Regional Administrator McKeon and Deputy Regional Administrator Lawrence Hasvold, Mr. Sanoian requested permission to use the locomotive to move material to repair the bridge. Regional Administrator McKeon advised Mr. Sanoian that the locomotive could not be used until it was in compliance with the applicable Federal regulations. January 19-22, 1996: The TIRL received loaded boxcar RBOX 40945 in interchange from Conrail, moved it across the bridge, and placed it at the consignee's facility on Tonawanda Island. This move presumably was made with the railroad's only locomotive. January 25, 1996: Principal Inspector Lutz again inspected the TIRL locomotive and issued inspection report No. 1, informing Mr. Sanoian of 14 items not in compliance with Federal railroad safety standards. As a result of the inspection, Inspector Lutz removed the TIRL locomotive from service by issuing a Special Notice for Repairs, Form FRA 6180 (``Form 8''). A copy of the form was placed in the locomotive cab. January 26, 1996: Inspector Ziolkowski hand-delivered a copy of the Form 8 to Mr. Sanoian. Despite the fact that the boxcar was placed on the trailing end of a stub track with the locomotive ahead of it, Mr. Sanoian stated that he had not moved the locomotive and could not have done so because it ``had no air.'' January 29, 1996: FRA Inspector Ron Marx conducted a track inspection on the TIRL and identified five deficiencies, including a five-and-one-sixteenth-inch cross level deviation on Bridge 7708810. This serious track defect does not meet even the minimum track geometry standards contained in 49 CFR Part 213. In addition, the added load placed on one rail by a downward tilt of the track to the downstream side further overloads the already severely degraded bridge structural members supporting the bridge timbers to which that rail is attached. Inspector Marx also found combustible debris located against the southeast corner of the bridge. January 29-31, 1996: Representatives of Parsons Brinckerhoff, Quade and Douglas, Inc. inspected Bridge 7708810. Parsons Brinckerhoff, an engineering consulting firm with nationally recognized expertise in bridges, including wooden structures, is under contract to DOT to inspect Bridge 7708810 and to advise FRA of the bridge's structural condition. Parsons Brinckerhoff evaluated the bridge in accordance with accepted principles of structural engineering as contained in the ``Manual for Railway Engineering'' published by the American Railway Engineering Association. Parsons Brinckerhoff determined, and reported to FRA, that the bridge is unsafe, even for the movement of TIRL's 50- ton locomotive. The investigation performed by Parsons Brinckerhoff on behalf of FRA disclosed that bridge 7708810 is in need of repair and should be closed to all rail traffic until adequate repairs have been made. A report of the investigation notes that severe deterioration and distress exist in the three northern stringers of the westernmost span of the bridge structure. The damage includes severe section loss caused by fungal attack, crushing of the bearing surfaces due to an inadequate bearing area, and horizontal shear cracks along most of the length of the stringers. The three stringers are so badly deteriorated that they are considered as failed. Because of the complete lack of support under one rail, the entire span is rated zero for live load capacity. Failure of the bridge under load could have very serious consequences. In addition to killing or injuring railroad crew members, failure of the bridge also could kill or injure pleasure boaters on the river or at the marina. A catastrophic failure of the bridge causing any pollution of the Niagara River, whether from locomotive diesel fuel or from the contents of a boxcar, could have international impact. Furthermore, failure of the railroad bridge over the fast-moving current could damage the nearby highway bridge. The results of bridge engineers' inspection of Bridge 7708810 have led FRA to conclude that any future use of the bridge poses an imminent and unacceptable threat to public safety. A past pattern of failure by the TIRL to comply with Federal railroad safety laws and regulations persuades FRA that reliance upon the cooperation of the TIRL to repair the bridge to safe condition is inadequate to protect public safety. I find that the unsafe conditions discussed above create an emergency situation involving a hazard of death or injury to persons. The Tonawanda Island Railroad may obtain relief from this Emergency Order by providing the Federal Railroad Administrator with a report of inspection and evaluation of repairs, indicating to FRA's satisfaction that the Bridge 7708810 has been acceptably repaired. The report should be prepared by an engineer who is technically proficient and legally competent in the field of railroad bridge engineering, and it should state that the capacity of the bridge to carry safely railroad cars and locomotives has been restored. The configuration and weights of the loads for which the determination has been made should be stated in the report. Upon FRA's approval of the bridge engineer's assessment of the bridge restoration, and following an inspection by FRA if the agency deems it necessary, the Administrator will rescind this Emergency Order. This Emergency Order shall take effect at 12:01 a.m. (EST) on February 13, 1996. Issued in Washington, D.C. on February 12, 1996. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Petition for Waiver of Compliance In accordance with Title 49 CFR Sections 211.9 and 211.41 notice is hereby given that the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has received a request for a waiver of compliance from certain requirements of Federal railroad safety regulations. Burlington Northern Railroad Union Pacific Railroad (Waiver Petition Docket Number H-95-4) The Burlington Northern Railroad (BN) and Union Pacific Railroad (UP) seek a waiver of compliance from certain sections of Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 216, Special Notice and Emergency Order Procedures: Railroad Track, Locomotive and Equipment, 217, Railroad Operating Rules, 218, Railroad Operating Practices, 220, Radio Standards and Procedures, 229, Railroad Locomotive Safety Standards, 233, Signal Systems Reporting Requirements, 235, Instructions Governing Applications for Approval of a Discontinuance or Material Modification of a Signal System or Relief from the Requirements Of Part 236, Rules, standards, and Instructions Governing the Installation, Inspection, Maintenance, and Repair of Signal and Train Control Systems, Devices, and Appliances, and 240, Qualification and Certification Of Locomotive Engineers, under Part 211.51, Tests, to allow them to develop, implement, and test technology designed to prevent train collisions and overspeed violations and to protect track maintenance personnel from trains. The program will enable the industry to demonstrate and validate the technology, referred to as for Positive Train Separation (PTS), before it is implemented on a larger scale. PTS is a non-vital safety overlay that works in conjunction with existing methods of operation and signal and control systems to protect against the consequences of human error. This approach provides a ``safety net'' for train operations while retaining the existing systems as the primary means of control. The PTS safety enhancements are achieved through a centrally controlled, communication-based system that enforces movement authority and speed restrictions for PTS-equipped trains. Three PTS segments work together to provide this enforcement: the server segment, the locomotive segment, and the communications segment. The server segment determines the enforceable movement authority and speed limit for each train under PTS control. This information is sent through the communications segment to the locomotive segment, located on board the controlling locomotive of each train. The locomotive segment enforces a train's movement and speed limits by monitoring the train's location and speed and applying the brakes to stop the train if necessary to prevent a violation. The pilot program will focus on proving PTS concepts and technology and on laying the groundwork for a production system. While the purpose of PTS is to enhance safety, the pilot program itself is not expected to yield immediate safety benefits. The program will focus on testing the technology without adversely affecting the safety of operations under existing signal and control systems, operating rules, and procedures, all of which will remain in effect. The PTS pilot program will be implemented on 863 miles of BN and UP track in the Pacific Northwest. The pilot territory includes portions of four BN operating divisions (Cascade, Pacific, Portland, and Pasco) and the Portland and Seattle subdivisions of UP's Boise Service Unit. Relief is sought for PTS test operations on all tracks of all types included in the pilot territory. The pilot territory includes single main track, two main tracks, sidings, and branch lines. Issued in Washington, D.C. on February 12, 1996. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Railroad Administration Notice of Application for Approval of Discontinuance or Modification of a Railroad Signal System or Relief From the Requirements of Title 49 CFR Part 236 Pursuant to Title 49 CFR Part 235 and 49 U.S.C. App. 26, the following railroads have petitioned the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) seeking approval for the discontinuance or modification of the signal system or relief from the requirements of 49 CFR Part 236 as detailed below. Block Signal Application (BS-AP)--No. 3380 Applicant: Twin Cities and Western Railroad Company The Twin Cities and Western Railroad Company (TCW) seeks approval of the proposed discontinuance and removal of the traffic control signal system (TCS), on the single main track, between Glencoe, Minnesota, milepost 466.9 and Tower E-14, near Hopkins, Minnesota, milepost 435.0, a distance of approximately 32 miles, and operate trains by track warrant control. The reason given for the proposed changes is that the character of the former Milwaukee Road trackage has changed substantially since the installation of the TCS, with the present traffic density and 30 mph maximum authorized speed, TCS is no longer required for safe operation. BS-AP-No. 3381 Applicant: Central Oregon and Pacific Railroad The Central Oregon and Pacific Railroad seeks approval of the proposed discontinuance and removal of the automatic block signal system, on the single main track, between Ashland, Oregon, milepost 429.1 and Glendale, Oregon, milepost 510, on the Siskiyou Line, a distance of approximately 81 miles. The reason given for the proposed changes is that current traffic and the maximum authorized speed of 25 mph do not justify continuation of the automatic block signal system. BS-AP--No. 3382 Applicant: Central Oregon and Pacific Railroad The Central Oregon and Pacific Railroad seeks approval of the proposed discontinuance and removal of the automatic block 4 signal system, on the single main track, between Cornutt, Oregon, milepost 538.8 and Springfield Junction, Oregon, milepost 644.3, on the Siskiyou Line, a distance of approximately 105.5 miles. The reason given for the proposed changes is that current traffic and the maximum authorized speed of 25 mph do not justify continuation of the automatic block signal system. BS-AP-No. 3383 Applicant: Consolidated Rail Corporation Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail), seeks approval of the proposed discontinuance and removal of the traffic control signal system, on the single main track Carman Branch, between Conrail's Chicago Line, ``CP-156'', milepost 0.0, near Carman, New York and Conrail's Selkirk Branch, ``CP-SH'', milepost 3.7, near Schenectady, New York, Albany Division. The proposed changes consist of the removal of intermediate signals 18E and 18W, and redesignation of the track to the Carman Running Track. The reason given for the proposed changes is to retire facilities no longer required for present operation. BS-AP-No. 3384 Applicant: Montana Rail Link, Incorporated The Montana Rail Link, Incorporated seeks approval of the proposed modification of the traffic control signal system, on the single main track, between East Hope, milepost 102.7 and West Kootenai, milepost 118.04, Idaho, on the Fourth Subdivision; consisting of the discontinuance and removal of 10 automatic intermediate block signals and installation of 8 automatic intermediate block signals, associated with the installation of electronic coded track circuits and pole line elimination. The reason given for the proposed changes is to upgrade the signal system and improve train operations. BS-AP-No. 3385 Applicant: Chesapeake and Albemarle Railroad Company The Chesapeake and Albemarle Railroad Company seeks approval of the proposed discontinuance and removal of the interlocking signals at the A & C Canal Draw Bridge, milepost 9.5, near Chesapeake, Virginia and at the Pasquotank River Swing Bridge, milepost 41.5, near Camden, North Carolina, replacing the absolute signals with stop signs. The reason given for the proposed changes is that the railroad has experienced much vandalism on a regular basis. BS-AP-No. 3386 Applicants: CSX Transportation, Incorporated Soo Line Railroad Company CSX Transportation, Incorporated and Soo Line Railroad Company jointly seek approval of the proposed discontinuance and removal of the automatic block signal system, on the single main track, between Bedford, Indiana, milepost Q245.8 and Mitchell, Indiana, milepost Q255.3, Louisville Division, Hoosier Subdivision. In addition the proposed changes include conversion of ``Bedford Interlocking'' from automatic to stop board operation, conversion of the power-operated switch at milepost Q245.91 to hand operation, and govern train operation under DTC Rules. The reason given for the proposed changes is that traffic density does not warrant retention of the signal system. BS-AP-No. 3387 Applicants: Norfolk Southern Corporation CSX Transportation, Incorporated The Norfolk Southern Corporation (NS) and CSX Transportation, Incorporated (CSX) jointly seek approval of the proposed reduction to the traffic control system limits, on the Winding Gulf Branch secondary track, Princeton Deepwater District, Pocahontas Division, near Stotesbury, West Virginia; consisting of the relocation of controlled holdout signal 66R from milepost WG-16.1 to milepost WG-12.2 and installation of an approach distance signal at milepost WG-14.2. The reason given for the proposed changes is to allow for control of traffic interchange between CSX and NS at Helen siding. Rules Standards & Instructions Application (RS&I-AP)--No. 1099 Applicant: Union Pacific Railroad Company The Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP) seeks relief from the requirements of Section 236.566 (49 CFR, 236.566) of the Rules, Standard and Instructions to the extent that UP be permitted to operate foreign or system, non-equipped automatic cab signal/automatic train stop (ACS/ATS) locomotives, involved in detour movements, in UP ACS/ATS territory as a result of derailments, natural disasters, etc., for a period of up to seven days subject to train operations under provisions of the General Code of Operating Rules, Rules 11.1 and 11.2, Absolute Block, and notification of the FRA within 24 hours of the beginning of each such movement. Applicant's justification for relief: To permit continued operations under such circumstances as natural disasters, derailments, or extraordinary service interruptions, for a limited length of time, without the need to obtain individual waivers or emergency provision, outside normal business hours, while relieving workload on both the UP and FRA in processing these repetitive waiver requests. RS&I No. 1100 Applicant: Consolidated Rail Corporation, Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) seeks relief from the requirements of the Rules, Standard and Instructions to the extent that they be allowed to operate non-equipped locomotives in automatic cab signal territory, on the two main tracks between ``Rochester'' Interlocking, milepost 25.9, near Rochester, Pennsylvania and ``CP Alliance'', milepost 83.2, near Alliance, Ohio, on the Fort Wayne Line, Pittsburgh Division, for the following operations: 1. Wire trains, work trains, wreck trains, and ballast cleaners to and from work; 2. Engines and Rail diesel cars moving to and from shops; and 3. Engines used in switching and transfer service, with or without cars, not exceeding 20 miles per hour. Applicant's justification for relief: Exemptions are already authorized for operation of non-equipped locomotives in cab signal territory at other locations on Conrail, and this relief request would be an extension of the already existing exemptions. Issued in Washington, D.C. on February 14, 1996. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Surface Transportation Board <SUP>1 [SBT Docket No. AB-167 (Sub-No. 1157X)] Consolidated Rail Corporation; Abandonment Exemption; in Lucas County, OH Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) has filed a notice of exemption under 49 CFR Part 1152 Subpart F--Exempt Abandonments to abandon approximately 2.5-miles of its rail line known as the Olive Industrial Track, from approximately milepost 82.90 to approximately milepost 85.40 in Lucas County, OH. Conrail has certified that: (1) No local traffic has moved over the line for at least 2 years; (2) there is no overhead traffic on the line; (3) no formal complaint filed by a user of rail service on the line (or by a state or local government entity acting on behalf of such user) regarding cessation of service over the line either is pending with the Board or with any U.S. District Court or has been decided in favor of complainant within the 2-year period; and (4) the requirements at 49 CFR 1105.7 (environmental reports), 49 CFR 1105.8 (historic reports), 49 CFR 1105.11 (transmittal letter), 49 CFR 1105.12 (newspaper publication), and 49 CFR 1152.50(d)(1) (notice to governmental agencies) have been met. Provided no formal expression of intent to file an offer of financial assistance (OFA) has been received, this exemption will be effective on March 21, 1996, unless stayed pending reconsideration. Environmental, historic preservation, public use, or trail use/rail banking conditions will be imposed, where appropriate, in a subsequent decision. Decided: February 13, 1996. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Transit Administration Environmental Impact Statement for Transportation Improvements in the Greenbush Line Corridor in Massachusetts ACTION: Notice of EIS cancellation. SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) is cancelling its preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for transportation improvements in the Greenbush Corridor linking the coastal communities of Braintree, Weymouth, Hingham, Cohasset, and Scituate, Massachusetts. The project sponsor, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), has announced its intention not to seek Federal financial assistance from FTA in constructing improvements in the Greenbush Corridor. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On October 5, 1992, FTA published a Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS for transportation improvements in the Greenbush Corridor linking the coastal communities of Braintree, Weymouth, Hingham, Cohasset, and Scituate, Massachusetts. In March 1995, FTA and the MBTA released a Supplemental Draft EIS, and published a Notice of Availability of that SDEIS on March 24, 1995. In January 1996, however, the MBTA notified FTA that it will not seek Federal funding for transportation improvements in the Greenbush Corridor; rather, the MBTA has chosen to finance the entirety of its project with state funds. Thus, there is no longer a proposal for Federal action in the Greenbush Corridor subject to the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act, nor an FTA-assisted project subject to the requirements of 49 U.S.C. Section 303. Accordingly, FTA is terminating its preparation of an EIS for the Greenbush Corridor. Issued on: February 15, 1996. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Railroad Administration [FRA Emergency Order No. 20, Notice No. 1] Commuter and Intercity Passenger Railroads, Including Public Authorities Providing Passenger Service, and Affected Freight Railroads; Emergency Order Requiring Enhanced Operating Rules and Plans for Ensuring the Safety of Passengers Occupying the Leading Car of a Train Introduction The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) of the United States Department of Transportation (DOT) has determined that the safety of passengers and railroad employees compels issuance of this Emergency Order. Based on the historical record, rail passenger transportation in the United States is an extremely safe mode of transportation. However, recent train accidents in New Jersey and Maryland, which have claimed a total of fourteen lives, have caused DOT, FRA, and the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) (also part of DOT) to have very serious concerns about the safety of certain aspects of rail passenger transportation. Of particular concern are those operations that involve carrying passengers in the lead car of a train over segments of track that do not have either cab signal systems (which provide the engineer with an on-board display of signal indications alongside the tracks) or automatic train stop or automatic train control systems (which automatically cause the train to stop or reduce speed where an engineer fails to respond appropriately to a trackside signal). Both of the recent accidents involved such operations. While thousands of such operations occur daily without incident, the occurrence of two fatal accidents in one week has caused DOT, FRA, and FTA to examine closely the need for immediate enhancements in the safety of such operations. Also of great concern, based on the Maryland accident, is passenger and crew egress after an accident. In summary, this order requires that commuter and intercity passenger railroads, including public authorities providing passenger service through contracts with other railroads, and any other entities (e.g., freight railroads with affected passenger service on their lines) whose actions are necessary to effectuate this order, take certain immediate steps with regard to any of their operations above 30 miles per hour that do not entail cab signal, automatic train stop, or automatic train control protections and that permit passengers to occupy the leading car (i.e., using either cab cars as the forward car in the push-pull mode or self-propelled locomotives with passenger seating (MU locomotives)). As set forth in detail below, those railroads are required to: (1) adopt and comply with an operating rule requiring that, when a passenger train stops for any reason, including a station stop, or its speed is reduced below 10 m.p.h., the train shall proceed under any speed limitations set forth in applicable railroad operating rules, and in addition, must be prepared to stop before passing the next signal; the train must maintain the prescribed speed until the next wayside signal is clearly visible and that signal displays a proceed indication, and the track to that signal is clear; (2) adopt and comply with an operating rule requiring that a crew member located in the operating cab of a controlling locomotive, cab car, or MU car, shall have a means to orally communicate and will communicate to another crew member the indication and location of each wayside signal affecting the movement of the train as soon as the signal becomes visible, for all signals which require either that the train be prepared to stop at the next wayside signal or that the train be prepared to pass the next wayside signal at restricted speed; (3) take certain measures to instruct and test employees on the aforementioned operating rules; and (4) submit to FRA an interim system safety plan for enhancing the safety of such operations that includes (i) a description of circumstances in which the leading car is permitted to be occupied by passengers; (ii) a review of operating rules relevant to such operations; (iii) plans for any short-term technology enhancements that would enhance train control; (iv) a review of crew management practices to see what steps can be taken to improve crew alertness; (v) a review of the hazards posed to passengers in the forward car by vehicles using highway-rail grade crossings; and (vi) a review of practices, in addition to marking exits, used by the railroad to inform passengers of the location and operation of emergency exits, specifying any plans for enhancing such information. In addition, each of these commuter and intercity passenger railroads, regardless of the speeds or equipment they use, is required to ensure that each emergency window on every passenger car is clearly marked on the outside and inside and that a representative sample has been inspected to make sure they are operable. FRA may amend this order at any time to require other actions to ensure safety. For example, depending on what FRA learns from the railroads' interim safety plans and other sources after issuance of this order, it may decide that safety requires it to prohibit one or more railroads from carrying passengers in the lead car in the absence of a cab signal, automatic train stop, or automatic train control system. Background New Jersey Transit Accident, Secaucus, NJ. On February 9, 1996, at about 8:40 a.m., a near-head-on collision occurred between New Jersey Transit trains 1254 and 1107 at mile post 2.8, on the borderline of Secaucus and Jersey City, New Jersey. Speed at the point of collision was approximately 7 m.p.h. for train 1254 and 53 m.p.h. for train 1107. Of the 325 passengers on both trains, one received fatal injuries and 162 reported minor injuries. The passenger fatality and most of the nonfatal injuries to passengers occurred on train 1254, which was operating with the cab control car forward and the locomotive pushing. In addition, the engineer was fatally injured. The cab control car incurred substantial damage as a result of near-frontal impact with the heavier locomotive of train 1107, operating in the ``pull'' mode. The locomotive engineer on train 1107 was fatally injured as a result of ``cornering'' of the locomotive cab that bypassed the collision posts in the short hood. Railroad property damage was estimated at more than $3.5 million. Although the trains involved were equipped with cab signal and automatic train control (ATC) apparatus, the wayside portion of the signal system on the lines in question did not provide cab signals. The method of operation was by wayside signal indication. Based on preliminary information derived from the joint investigation of the NTSB, FRA, and other parties, the accident appears to have resulted from failure of train 1254 to observe signal indications requiring that the train be stopped short of the junction where the accident occurred. Agencies are investigating whether lack of alertness on the part of the locomotive engineer, who was working the second portion a night ``split shift,'' may have contributed to the failure to observe signal indications. Since the accident, New Jersey Transit has eliminated use of the night split shift, which had previously been a longstanding practice on the railroad. MARC accident, Silver Spring, MD. On February 16, 1996, at approximately 5:40 p.m., a near-head-on collision occurred between Maryland Rail Commuter Authority (MARC) train P28616 and National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) train PO2916 on the CSX Transportation line at Silver Spring, Maryland (milepost 8.3). The Amtrak train consisted of two locomotives in the lead and 15 cars. The MARC train consisted of a cab control car in the lead followed by two passenger coaches and a locomotive pushing the consist. The accident resulted in 11 fatalities, consisting of 3 crew members and 8 passengers who were located in the MARC cab car. Non- fatal injuries were sustained by at least 13 additional passengers of the MARC train. As this order was prepared, one passenger remained in critical condition. Early investigative findings by staff of the NTSB and FRA indicate that the MARC train, proceeding eastbound toward Washington Union Station on Track No. 2, passed an intermediate signal conveying an approach indication (proceed prepared to stop at next signal), made a scheduled station stop immediately past the signal, accelerated to approximately 63 miles per hour (maximum timetable speed 70 miles per hour), and then applied the train's emergency brakes upon rounding a curve and establishing sight distance for the home signal governing a crossover between the two main tracks, which is believed to have displayed a stop signal. The MARC train proceeded past the signal and struck the midpoint of the lead locomotive of the Amtrak train, which was diverging from Track No. 2 to Track No. 1 through the crossover. The initial impact sheared off the left collision post of the MARC cab car, together with a substantial portion of the front, side, and roof structure on the left side approximately one-third of the way back along the length of the car. The impact also ruptured the left diesel fuel tank of the Amtrak lead locomotive, discharging an undetermined amount of diesel fuel into the MARC cab car. The MARC train continued substantially in line, apparently raking the second locomotive and coming to rest substantially parallel with the Amtrak train. Diesel fuel present in the cab car ignited. Both of these accidents involved casualties in so-called ``push/ pull'' operations with the consist being pushed by a locomotive at the rear. Control of such operations is conducted from the front of a cab control car, or ``cab car,'' where an engineer compartment is located. Control cables run the length of the train, as do electrical lines providing power for heat, lights, and other purposes throughout the train. Cab cars provide passenger seating, as well as providing a location from which the train is operated. Cab cars are built with the same minimum longitudinal strength as locomotives and with substantial collision posts at each end to prevent incursion of other vehicles into the occupied volume. However, cab cars are lighter than powered vehicles, and no combination of structural measures can wholly prevent harm to persons in collisions involving substantial forces. Occupants of cab cars may incur a significantly higher risk of serious injury when compared with occupants of a locomotive-hauled consist, if the cab car collides with a heavier rail vehicle or any highway or rail vehicle transporting hazardous materials. Similar risks may obtain in the case of electric multiple-unit (EMU) service and diesel multiple-unit (DMU) service, because those vehicles have a structure similar to that of a cab car. FRA recognizes that cab cars have provided hundreds of millions of miles of safe transportation since they were introduced in the late 1950s. EMU and DMU service has been provided with a high degree of safety since the early decades of this century. However, the recent accidents noted above compel FRA to review the safety of these operations to determine whether means can be found to further reduce the risk of serious injury in the subject service. Prior accidents further illustrate the potential risk. For instance, on August 1, 1981, at Beverly, Massachusetts, a commuter train engineer was killed and 28 passengers were injured when a commuter train in the push mode collided head-on with a freight train due to dispatcher error. On January 2, 1982, at Southhampton, Pennsylvania, a single rail diesel car commuter train collided with a gas truck at a highway-rail crossing due to malfunction of the automated warning device at the crossing (loss of shunt). On November 12, 1987, at Boston, Massachusetts, a train in the push mode struck the locomotive at the back of a train proceeding in the same direction on the same track, resulting in injuries to 3 crew members and 220 passengers, due in part to a wayside signal malfunction. At Gary, Indiana, on January 18, 1993, two EMU consists struck in a cornering collision at the approach to a gauntlet bridge, resulting in 7 fatalities and 95 persons injured, due to failure of one of the engineers to observe signal indications. The Need for Action Although definitive conclusions have not been reached, preliminary indications are that both the Secaucus and Silver Spring accidents could have been prevented had wayside signal indications been followed, and the death tolls might have been reduced significantly had occupied cab cars not been the lead cars. Additionally, the Silver Spring accident indicates a need to ensure that emergency windows are clearly marked and operable. FRA believes that certain immediate measures are necessary to prevent a recurrence of these problems. 1. Necessary Rule Changes With regard to cab car forward and MU operations over territory lacking at least cab signals, the immediate need is to ensure that signal indications are followed. FRA believes that certain operating rules, already in place on many railroads, will assist engineers in remembering and adhering to signal indications. One rule will require that signal indications for an approach or less favorable than an approach be called out by the engineer as they are seen. A designated crewmember elsewhere in the train will acknowledge the communication and, in the absence of an appropriate response to a restrictive indication that has been communicated, take action to ensure the appropriate response. This will serve as a simple device to help the engineer remember to abide by signal indications and will add safety redundancy by involving other crew members in responsibility for safety with regard to compliance with signals. The second rule will require that, if a passenger train enters a block on a signal indication and the train stops for any reason, including a station stop, or its speed is reduced below 10 m.p.h., the train shall proceed under speed limitations set forth in existing applicable operating rules, and in addition, must be prepared to stop before passing the next signal; the train must maintain the prescribed speed until the next wayside signal is clearly visible and that signal displays a proceed indication, and the track to that signal is clear. (For purposes of this order, a ``block'' is a length of track of defined limits the use of which is governed by wayside signal indications.) This will prevent situations where a signal displays an aspect less favorable than ``clear'' prior to a station stop but the engineer, after stopping and resuming movement, forgets that he or she should be operating at a reduced speed. This very well may be what happened in the Silver Spring accident. Under this rule, if the next signal is clear, timetable speed may be resumed. However, if the next signal requires a stop, the engineer will have the train under control and be prepared to stop short of the signal. This rule will presumably result in a certain amount of slowing of operations between station stops and the next forward signal, but FRA believes such relatively minimal delay is warranted to ensure safety. 2. Interim Safety Plans FRA believes there is a broader need to have railroads carefully evaluate their passenger operations with a view toward enhancing the safety of those operations, with particular attention given to the safety of operations where passengers are in the lead car and to ways that train control systems might be upgraded. FRA has concluded that the safety of such operations can be enhanced by having each railroad develop an interim system safety plan addressing these subjects. This will both focus the attention of those railroads on avoiding occurrences similar to the recent accidents and provide FRA with detailed information allowing it to determine what further action may be necessary. Therefore, this order will require railroads operating scheduled intercity or commuter rail service to conduct an analysis of their operations and file with FRA an interim safety plan indicating the manner in which risk of a collision involving a cab car is addressed. Railroads are encouraged to implement identified opportunities for risk reduction immediately. Upon review of these plans and the subject operations, FRA will determine whether further action is warranted. 3. Emergency Exits Finally, there is a need to ensure that emergency exits are clearly marked and in operable condition on all passenger lines, regardless of the equipment used or train control system. FRA's regulations generally require that all passenger cars be equipped with at least four emergency opening windows, which must be designed to permit rapid and easy removal during a crisis situation. The investigation of the Silver Spring accident has raised some concerns that at least some of the occupants of the MARC train attempted unsuccessfully to exit through the windows. Whether those same people eventually were among those who exited safely, or whether those persons were attempting to open windows that were not emergency windows is not known at this time. However, there is sufficient reason for concern to require that measures be taken to ensure that such windows are readily identifiable and operable when they are needed. Accordingly, the order requires that any emergency windows that are not already legibly marked as such on the inside and outside be so marked, and that a representative sample of all such windows be examined to ensure operability. Effective Date and Notice to Affected Persons This order shall take effect at 12:01 a.m on February 21, 1996. Issued in Washington, DC, on February 20, 1996. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Transit Administration Environmental Impact Statement for the Metrorail Extension to Largo Town Center, Prince Georges County, Maryland ACTION: Notice of intent to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). SUMMARY: The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and the Maryland Mass Transit Administration (MTA), in cooperation with Prince George's County and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), intend to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for a Metrorail Extension from the Addison Road Metrorail Station to Largo Town Center in Prince George's County, Maryland. The EIS will evaluate transportation improvements in the corridor between the Addison Road Metrorail Station and Largo Town Center in Prince George's County. Transportation alternatives proposed for consideration in the project area include: (1) The No-Build option, under which the existing and programmed bus, rail, and roadway improvements in the study area would be assumed to be implemented; (2) a Transportation Systems Management (TSM) alternative which consists of increased coverage of the bus service network; and (3) the Metrorail Extension from the Addison Road Metrorail Station to Largo Town Center, a three mile (4.8 kilometer), two station addition to the region's rail transit system. Options to mitigate adverse impacts and to support local land use will be considered. Description of Study Area and Project Need The study area and corridor are wholly within Prince George's County, beginning at the existing Addison Road Metrorail Station. The study area is also bounded by Sheriff Road on the north, Central Avenue (MD 214) on the south, and Landover Road on the east. Rail transit service to and from Washington DC to the study corridor is available on the Metrorail Blue Line, provided by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA). Existing traffic is primarily carried by Central Avenue (MD 214) and I-95/I-495 (the Capital Beltway) with high traffic volumes and poor level-of-service at many of the signalized intersections along Central Avenue and along major portions of the Capital Beltway. The proposed Metrorail Extension will provide rail transit service to the rapidly developing areas in the Largo Town Center. The proposed extension will also support economic development while contributing to higher transit use to and from Washington, DC employment centers. This increased transit ridership will improve cross-county public transportation and help achieve regional clean air goals. Alternatives Transportation alternatives proposed for consideration in the project area include: (1) The No-Build option, under which the existing and programmed bus, rail, and roadway improvements in the study area would be assumed to be implemented; (2) a Transportation Systems Management (TSM) alternative which consists of increased coverage of the bus service network; and (3) the Metrorail Extension from the Addison Road Metrorail Station to Largo Town Center, a three mile (4.8 kilometer), two station addition to the region's rail transit system. Options to mitigate adverse impacts and to support local land use will be considered. Issued on: February 23, 1996. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Surface Transportation Board [Docket No. AB-6 (Sub-No. 370X)] Burlington Northern Railroad Company--Abandonment Exemption-- Between Mesa and Basin City, Franklin County, WA ACTION: Notice of exemption. SUMMARY: The Board exempts from the prior approval requirements of 49 U.S.C. 10903-04 the abandonment by Burlington Northern Railroad Company of its 11.20-mile line located between milepost 0.00, near Mesa, and milepost 11.20, near Basin, in Franklin County, WA. The exemption is subject to environmental, endangered species, and standard employee protective conditions. DATES: Provided no formal expression of intent to file an offer of financial assistance has been received, this exemption will be effective on March 30, 1996. Decided: February 20, 1996.